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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal is taken from a final order of the Second District Court.
1;
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0), § 78-2-2(4), and § 78-2a-3(2)G).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

agreements, executed at different times and containing fundamentally
inconsistent terms and provisions, was in error or whether the agreements
cai 1 soi i lehc • v>> ' be hai i i ionized and enfoi ced coi lsistei it nth 1:1 le disti ict
court's reasoning. (R. at 1660-95, 1871-78).
"Questions of contract interpretation not requiring resort to extrinsic
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district court. Swan Creek Village Homeowners v. Warne, 134 P.3d 1122,
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2. ' ' Whether the disti i ::t :: : i n It ii t iproperl> grai ited si n i u nary ji idgi nent
deeming the contested release agreements unambiguous but then looking
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beyond the four corners and the plain language of the agreements in
endeavoring to establish an intent inconsistent with that expressed therein.
(R. at 16324654, 1871-1878).
Questions of contract interpretation are reviewed for correctness
with no deference accorded to the trial court. Sackler v. Savin, 897 P.2d
1217, 1220 (Utah 1995). "We review the district court's entry of summary
judgment for correctness. We recognize that "[sjummary judgment is
appropriate only when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Wilcox v.
Anchor Wate Co.,

P.3d

(Utah 2006).

"If, however, the meaning of a contract must be determined by the
consideration of extrinsic evidence, that raises a question of fact for the trier
of fact that will preclude summary judgment." Interwest Construction v.
Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350, 1359 (Utah 1996).l
3.

Whether the district court erred in ruling that a secret indemnity

agreement executed between the Defendants can be invoked as a shield to
abrogate Plaintiffs claims on the basis that the effect of the undisclosed
1

Reference to extrinsic evidence to ascertain the parties' intent creates "a
question of fact to be resolved by the trier of fact, therefore precluding [a]
grant of summary judgment." WebBank v. American General Annuity
Service Corp., 54 P.3d 1139, 1142 (Utah 2002).
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accord would ostensibly result in an impermissible circuity of action. (R. at
1632-1654,1660-1695,1871-1878).
Questions of contract interpretation are reviewed for correctness
with no deference accorded to the trial court. Sackler v. Savin, 897 P.2d
1217, 1220 (Utah 1995). "We review [a] district court's decision to grant
summary judgment for correctness, granting no deference to the district
court." Swan Creek Village Homeowners v. Warne, 134 P.3d 1122,
1126 (Utah 2006).
DETERMINATIVE LAW
Since the primary issues raised on appeal all concern the force and
effect of certain contractual provisions interpreted by the district court,
there are no explicitly dispositive statutes, ordinances, rules, or regulations.
Nevertheless, the following case law would inform the Court's adjudication
of this matter:
"Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issues of
material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Because entitlement to summary judgment is a question of law, we
accord no deference to the trial court's resolution of the legal issues
presented. In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view the facts
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and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party." Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 48 P.3d 918, 924 (Utah
2002)(internal citation omitted).
"[SJummary judgment may not be granted if... an ambiguity exists
in the contract and there is a factual issue as to what the parties intended."
Id. "When a contract is clear on its face, extraneous or parol evidence is
generally not admissible to explain the intent of the contract." Faulkner v.
Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983). "When ambiguity does
exist, the intent of the parties is a question of fact to be determined by the
jury." Plateau Min. Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands and Forestry, 802 P.2d
720, 725 (Utah 1990).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This case arises from a serious incident of medical malpractice that
occurred on July 18, 2000, at McKay-Dee Hospital, leaving the patient,
Terry F. Ward, mentally impaired and permanently disabled.
Prior to filing a complaint Terry Ward's wife, Plaintiff Vickie Lynn
Ward, agreed to a settlement with the anesthesiologist who participated in
her husband's operation, John Luckwitz, MD, an employee of Third Party
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Defendant Mountain West Anesthesia, LLC (hereinafter "Mountain West").
In connection with this settlement, Mrs. Ward executed a release agreement
on March 16, 2001. A second release containing different provisions and
expressly purporting to supersede the first release was subsequently
executed on March 29, 2001.
Mrs. Ward then brought an action against Defendant McKay-Dee
Hospital (hereinafter "McKay-Dee") under a theory of ostensible agency.
Mrs. Ward asserted that the hospital is vicariously liable for the negligence
that resulted in Mr. Ward's catastrophic injuries since McKay-Dee both
selected and procured the anesthesia services for the ill-fated procedure.
McKay-Dee and Mountain West sought and obtained summary judgment
relying on certain provisions taken from the first of those two different
March 2001 release agreements.
Plaintiff appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor
of Defendants McKay-Dee and Mountain West. The disposition of this
appeal turns on the current legal effect of the two separate releases.
Relevant Facts
1.

On or about July 18, 2000, Terry F. Ward was admitted to McKay-

Dee Hospital for routine hernia repair surgery. (R. at 580, 743).
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2.

The operation was performed by Dr. Steven J. Carabine. (R. at 743).

3.

Dr. Carabine was assisted during the procedure by anesthesiologist

Dr. John Luckwitz. (R. at 743).
4.

Terry Ward never met Dr. Luckwitz until just moments before the

surgery. (R. at 575, 583).
5.

Dr. Luckwitz was selected and/or assigned to participate in the

surgery by McKay-Dee Hospital. (R. at 573-575, 579, 597).
6.

As an anesthesiologist working at McKay-Dee Hospital, Dr.

Luckwitz customarily received assignments from the Hospital specifying
which surgeries he would participate in on any given day. (R. at 574, 579,
597-598).
7.

Prior to Terry Ward's surgery, Mr. Ward was considered to be "a

very healthy gentleman without underlying medical conditions." (R. at
575).
8.

During Terry Ward's surgery, severe complications arose resulting

in, among other things, cardiac arrest and permanent brain injury. (R. at
581,758).
9.

Claims arising from Dr. Luckwitz's participation in the surgery were

subsequently settled, and a final Release and Settlement Agreement
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memorializing the same was executed on March 29, 2001. (R. at 16831695).
10.

The final Release and Settlement Agreement ("Final Agreement")

was executed by Vickie L. Ward, as Permanent Guardian and Conservator
of the Estate of Terry F. Ward, and by Scottsdale Insurance Company, as
agent for Dr. John Luckwitz and Mountain West Anesthesia. (R. at 168384, 1695).
11.

Under the terms of the Final Agreement, all claims against McKay-

Dee Hospital were expressly reserved. (R. at 1685).
12.

The Final Agreement includes a complete integration clause

explicitly affirming that there are no other valid or binding arrangements or
agreements of any kind between any of the parties:
This Agreement contains the entire agreement between the
Claimant, the Insured, and the Insurance Company . . . There
are no other understandings or agreements, verbal or
otherwise . . . between the Parties.
(R. at 1692) (emphasis added).
13.

The Final Agreement additionally provides:
The Parties . . . warrant and represent that no promise,
inducement or agreement not expressed in this Agreement
has been made to them and that this Agreement constitutes
the entire agreement between the Parties and that the terms
of this Agreement are contractual and not mere recitals.
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(R. at 1693) (emphasis added).
14.

A preliminary settlement document entitled "Settlement Agreement

and General Release" ("preliminary agreement") was executed on March
16, 2001, two weeks before the Final Agreement. (R. at 1681).
15.

The preliminary agreement contained a boilerplate indemnification

clause not incorporated into the Final Agreement. (R. at 1678-1681, 16831695).
16.

Plaintiff has maintained that pursuant to the express terms of the

Final Agreement, the preliminary agreement was superseded and is of no
legal effect. (R. at 1660-1675).
17.

Notwithstanding the disputed validity of the preliminary agreement,

like the Final Agreement, it likewise articulates the parties' unequivocal
intent of preserving Plaintiffs' claims against McKay-Dee Hospital:
Nothing in this Release shall be construed as releasing
Ward's claims against. . . McKay Dee Hospital, and/or its
employees.
(R. at 1678) (emphasis added).
18.

McKay-Dee Hospital is not a party to either the Final Agreement or

the preliminary agreement, and nothing in either document suggests that
McKay-Dee Hospital was an express or intended third-party beneficiary, or
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had any standing to invoke or enforce the same. (R. at 1678-1681, 16831695).
19.

At the time the preliminary agreement and the Final Agreement were

negotiated and executed, Mountain West had a separate secret contractual
arrangement with McKay-Dee Hospital in place that included certain
indemnification provisions that Mountain West failed to disclose to
Plaintiff. (R. at 1455-1476).
20.

In February 2004, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint asserting,

among other things, a claim against McKay-Dee Hospital under a theory of
ostensible agency, claiming that McKay-Dee was vicariously liable for the
acts and omissions of Dr. Luckwitz. (R. at 759-760).
21.

Several years after the action below was brought, both Mountain

West and McKay-Dee later invoked the secret indemnification agreement
that they had amongst themselves to argue that Plaintiff could not pursue an
ostensible agency claim against McKay-Dee Hospital claiming it would
result in a so-called "circuity of action." (R. at 1404-1416, 1479-1485,
1501-1519, 1877).
22.

On November 13, 2006, the trial court heard oral argument on a

summary judgment motion filed by Mountain West and joined by McKay-
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Dee Hospital, which posited, among other things, that the preliminary
agreement remained enforceable and could be harmonized with the Final
Agreement which explicitly purported to superseded it, and that the secret
indemnity agreement between Mountain West and McKay-Dee Hospital
could be invoked to create a circuity of action precluding Plaintiffs claims
notwithstanding their failure to inform Plaintiff of the agreement at the time
the Final Agreement was negotiated. (R. at 1871-1878).
23.

The trial court subsequently entered an order granting summary

judgment. (R. at 1886-1889).
24.

Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal seeking review of the trial court's

grant of summary judgment. (R. at 1890-1892).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court's grant of summary judgment motion is premised on a
disputed indemnification clause found in the preliminary agreement but not
incorporated into the Final Agreement. Plaintiff contends that pursuant to
several separate merger and integration clauses contained in the Final
Agreement, the entire preliminary agreement was superseded and rendered
invalid.
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Plaintiff argues that since the trial court found no ambiguity in the
terms of the final agreement, it had a duty to ascertain and to enforce the
parties' intent consistent with the plain language thereof. By ignoring and
giving no effect to the multiple merger and integration mechanisms,
however, the trial court failed to do that. Additionally, the trial court
entertained and relied on extrinsic evidence to arrive at an outcome
inconsistent with these same contractual provisions by purporting to
"harmonize" the Final Agreement with the preliminary agreement to
preserve the disputed indemnification provision.
Plaintiff alternatively argues that if both the Final Agreement and the
preliminary agreement remain valid notwithstanding the multiple
integration clauses, and if extrinsic evidence is to be freely considered in
determining their underlying intent, then it is clear that one of the central
components of the settlement was to preserve, to the fullest extent,
Plaintiffs claims against McKay-Dee Hospital. The settlement between
Plaintiff and Mountain West was not to be interpreted or applied in any
way that would impede those claims.
Mountain West, however, subsequently came forward endeavoring
to impede Plaintiffs claims against McKay-Dee by claiming that if
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Plaintiff recovers from McKay-Dee, Mountain West may in turn have to
indemnify McKay-Dee on the basis of an alleged arrangement that McKayDee and Mountain West have with each other. Mountain West failed to
disclose its arrangement vis-a-vis McKay-Dee to Plaintiff during
settlement, but now wants to employ the terms of that agreement, in concert
with the separate terms of the preliminary settlement with Plaintiff to
prevent Plaintiff from pursuing her separate claims against McKay-Dee lest
Mountain West incur some liability to McKay-Dee.
Finally, Plaintiff contends that the concept of "circular litigation"
relied upon by the trial court in this case is erroneous because it essentially
requires a prospective adjudication of circumstances and claims that may or
may not actually ripen into an actual conflict. Additionally, in the case at
issue, the trial court simply assumes the existence and validity of an
ostensible indemnification arrangement between Mountain West and
McKay-Dee, but fails to make any explicit findings on the record that it
ever actually reviewed such a document and could legitimately conclude as
a matter of law that it is enforceable and that no viable defenses to its
application in this context exist. There was no argument and no briefing
regarding this side agreement and its validity or applicability.

12

Summary judgment was inappropriately granted for all of these
reasons.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT PREMISED ON AN INCORRECT
DETERMINATION OF THE LEGAL EFFECT OF THE
PRELIMINARY AGREEMENT VIS-A-VIS THE FINAL
AGREEMENT,
Paramount to this Court's review is a determination of the legal

effect of the preliminary agreement which provides the critical
underpinning of the trial court's summary judgment ruling. The
preliminary agreement contains a disputed indemnification clause not
incorporated into the parties' Final Agreement, upon which the trial court's
grant of summary judgment motion was premised.
If this Court agrees with Plaintiff that the entire preliminary
agreement has been integrated and superseded by the Final Agreement, the
Court need not proceed to determine the particular scope and effect of the
contested indemnification clause, and attempt to divine the parties'
understandings and intentions with respect to the same.
"The lower court's interpretation of a contract presents a question of
law, which we review for correctness. We also review for correctness the
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trial court's grant of summary judgment and afford no deference to its legal
conclusions." Tom Heal Commercial Real Estate, Inc. v. Overton, 116
P.3d 965, 967 (Utah App. 2005).
"When reviewing a trial court's grant of a motion for summary
judgment, this court. . . considers all evidence and reasonable inferences
derived therefrom in the light most favorable to the losing party below."
Bear River Mutual Ins. Co. v. Williams, 153 P.3d 798 (Utah App. 2006).
A.

The preliminary agreement was explicitly superseded by the
express terms of the Final Agreement

"A basic tenet of contract law is that prior negotiations and
agreements merge into the final written agreement on the subject." Panos
v. Olsen and Associates Const., Inc., 123 P.3d 816, 819 (Utah App. 2005)
(citations omitted). "Importantly, courts apply a presumption that a writing
which on its face appears to be an integrated agreement is what it appears to
be." The Cantamar, L.L.C v. Champagne, 142 P.3d 140, 147 (Utah App.
2006).
"If contract terms are clear and unambiguous, we normally interpret
them according to their plain and ordinary meaning without resorting to
extrinsic evidence." Homer v. Smith, 866 P.2d 622, 629 (Utah App. 1993)
(citations omitted).

14

In the present matter, the language incorporated by the parties in
their Final Agreement makes apparent that they intended it to be a final and
fully integrated expression of the settlement reached:
The Parties . . . warrant and represent that no promise,
inducement, or agreement not expressed in this Agreement
has been made to them and that this Agreement constitutes
the entire agreement between the Parties and that the terms of
this Agreement are contractual and not mere recitals.
(R. at 1693).
This Agreement contains the entire agreement between the
Claimant, the Insured, and the Insurance Company with
regard to the matters set forth in it. There are no other
understandings or agreements, verbal or otherwise, in relation
to the Agreement, between the parties except as expressly set
forth in it.
(R. at 1692).
The viability of Mountain West's summary judgment motion,
however, was entirely contingent upon the application of a boilerplate
indemnification provision recited in the preliminary agreement but
excluded in the Final Agreement. (R. at 1871-1877). In granting summary
judgment then, the district court completely ignored the two express and
separate merger/integration clauses found in the Final Agreement. Instead,
the district court purported to "harmonize" the preliminary agreement with
the Final Agreement, rather than simply interpreting the merger/integration

15

clauses in accordance with their plain, unambiguous terms. (R. at 18711877)
In essence, the district court's ruling suggests that while the Final
Agreement expressly disclaims all other "promises, inducements, or
agreements," and establishes itself as the, "entire agreement between the
Claimant, the Insured, and the Insurance Company," there really are, in
fact, ancillary agreements, and the Final Agreement is not the conclusive
integrated agreement that it purports to be. Id The district court, for
instance, erroneously suggests that the agreements can be "harmonized"
and that the multiple integration/merger clauses of the Final Agreement do
not supersede the indemnification clause of the preliminary agreement
because the Final Agreement does not specifically and separately disclaim
the indemnification clause. Id. There is no legitimate authority for such a
proposition, and this Court should not uphold a standard whereby every
provision of a preliminary arrangement not ultimately incorporated into a
final arrangement is presumed to remain in force despite an express
integration clause unless the final agreement specifically addresses and
invalidates each such preliminary provision separately.
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Even the case law cited by the district court fails to support this
misguided notion. For example, the district court looks to Acequia, Inc. v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of America 226 F.3d 798 (7th Cir. 2000), to support the
proposition that an original contract remains in force unless expressly
superseded by a later agreement. (R. at 1873). While Acequia does indeed
deal with the issue of the force and effect of two separate agreements
between the disputing parties, unlike the present case, neither agreement
includes the type of express merger/integration clause that the Final
Agreement in this matter uses to memorialize the parties' accord. In fact, in
this case, we have not just one, but several distinct clauses purporting to
close the loop and rendering the Final Agreement just that, a final and
complete agreement. (R. at 1692-1693). Likewise, Lincoln Elec. Co. v. St.
Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. 210 F.3d 672 (6th Cir. 2000), relied on by the
trial court, is inapposite to the present case for the same reasons.
B.

If the Final Agreement is unambiguous, as the trial court
declares, its terms must be given effect and interpreted in
accordance with their plain meaning and without resort to
external, contradictory evidence.

"If the contract is in writing and the language is not ambiguous, the
intention of the parties must be determined from the words of the
agreement." Bailey-Allen Co., Inc. v. Kurzet 945 P.2d 180,190 (Utah
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App. 1997); also Homer v. Smith. 866 P.2d 622, 629 (Utah App. 1993).
Additionally, this Court has held, "If the language within the four corners
of the contract is unambiguous a court determines the parties' intentions
from the plain meaning of the contractual language as a matter of law."
Panos at 820.
In the present matter, the trial court cannot find the terms of the
Final Agreement unambiguous on the one hand, but then simply disregard
or situationally suspend those terms on the other without correction by this
Court on review. The Defendants, in pursuit of summary disposition,
advanced all manner of carefully selected extrinsic and parol evidence to
urge the trial court to superimpose parts of the preliminary agreement on
the Final Agreement in violation of multiple merger/integration clauses.
The trial court should have resisted: "In interpreting unambiguous
contracts, we do not consider a party's subjective intent, but rather assume
its intent is accurately reflected in the plain meaning of the terms used. If
the language within the four corners of the contract is unambiguous, the
parties' intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the
contractual language" Tom Heal at 968 (emphasis added) (internal
citations omitted). "[R]egardless of whether the parties may have had
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preliminary agreements . . . we will assume that a writing dealing with the
same subject was intended by the parties to supersede any prior or
contemporaneous agreements." Novell Inc. v. Canopy Group, Inc., 92
P.3d 768, 772 (Utah App. 2004) (citations omitted).
If Mountain West indeed considered an indemnification provision
like the one set out in the preliminary agreement fundamental to its interests
in settling with Plaintiff, it had an affirmative obligation to either see that
such a provision was negotiated for and incorporated into the Final
Agreement, or at very least to see that the Final Agreement was not
expressly and comprehensively integrated, as it clearly was in this case. (R.
at 1692-1693). The parties to a contract "have a duty to make certain that
their agreements have in fact been fully included in the final document."
Panos at 819-820. This Court has found the failure to do so fatal to the type
of relief sought by the Defendants: "[This] may seem harsh but serves the
purpose of preserving the integrity of the final document and encouraging
the diligence of the parties." Embassy Group, Inc. v. Hatch, 865 P.2d 1366,
1370 (Utah App. 1993).
As it stands, Defendants concede, as they must in order to qualify for
summary disposition and to avoid the need for a jury determination, that the
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language of the Final Agreement and the preliminary agreement is
unambiguous. But they are then forced to prop up their position arguing for
the parallel application of the preliminary agreement with the Final
Agreement using all manner of extrinsic evidence in an effort to subtly
undermine the merger and integration mechanisms of the Final Agreement.
The plain language of the Final Agreement should be respected and
the district court's summary judgment ruling overturned.
II.

ALTERNATIVELY, IF BOTH AGREEMENTS REMAIN
VALID, AND IF EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE IS TO BE
CONSIDERED, THEN IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE PARTIES
INTENT WAS THAT THE SETTLEMENT NOT IMPEDE
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS AGAINST McKAY-DEE HOSPITAL.
In virtually identical fashion, the preliminary agreement and the

Final Agreement both provide:
Nothing in this Release shall be construed as releasing
Ward's claims against. . . McKay Dee Hospital, and/or its
employees.
(R. at 1678).
Yet Mountain West, by pursuing summary judgment below, has
essentially sought to have the agreements judicially construed in such a
fashion as to affect the release of Plaintiff s claims against McKay-Dee
Hospital. Together with McKay-Dee, Mountain West advanced a theory on
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summary judgment that relied on a disputed provision contained
exclusively in the earlier of the two agreements. What the preliminary
agreement could not do directly with respect to dispensing of this litigation,
Defendants sought to do circuitously by using the preliminary agreement as
a key character in a Parade of Horribles along with a secret indemnification
agreement that the Defendants concluded amongst themselves. This
theory, based on prospective interpretations of potential contractual
disputes, gives rise to what they call "circular indemnification", which will
be addressed infra.
On the other hand, the context of the specific reservation of claims
against McKay-Dee Hospital, which figures prominently in both
memorializations of the settlement, suggests the substantial weight and
importance the parties attached to that provision. Indeed, in adjudicating a
similar motion earlier, the trial court declared:
To me, it's absolutely clear when I read these two agreements
that Mrs. Ward never intended - and any [sic] of the parties
never intended to release McKay-Dee Hospital... it's very
clear to me that this settlement was not designed to include
the hospital.
(R. at 1908: 44, 45).

21

Additionally, the attorney representing Plaintiff during the
settlement negotiations provided deposition testimony that the
merger/integration provisions were intended to be taken at face value, and
that the overarching intent was that no aspect of the settlement with
Mountain West was to interfere with Plaintiffs pursuit of remedies against
McKay-Dee Hospital. (See R. at 1909: 51). The intent and understanding
was to proceed against McKay-Dee Hospital without hindrance or
interference from Mountain West, but Mountain West's current posture is
clearly preventing that from happening in contravention of the settlement.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS TREATMENT OF A
SECRET INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENT CONCLUDED
AMONGST THE DEFENDANTS AS A COMPONENT OF
THEIR DEFENSE TO PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS.
A.

There is arguably no actual existing case or controversy that
wouldjustify the application of the theory of "circular
litigation " since Mountain West's claim is entirely
speculative at this point

"[A] judgment can be rendered only in a real controversy between
adverse parties." Salt Lake County v. Bangerter, 928 P.2d 384, 385 (Utah
1996) (emphasis added). Thus, "courts will not issue advisory opinions or
examine a controversy until such a clash actually occurs". Moab Citizens
Alliance v. Grand County, 118 P.3d 879, 881-82 (Utah App. 2005)
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(emphasis added); also State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359, 371 (Utah 1995);
Boyle v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 866 P.2d 595, 598 (Utah App.1993).
In the present matter however, the trial court granted summary
judgment in part reasoning that if the indemnification clause of the
preliminary agreement survives the merger/integration clause of the Final
Agreement, then there is a "chain of indemnity agreements [that] creates
circular litigation." (R. at 1877). The trial court continues, "[I]n the event
Mrs. Ward is awarded damages against McKay-Dee Hospital, McKay-Dee
Hospital has a contractual right to indemnification from Mountain West,
which has a contractual right to indemnification from Mrs. Ward." Id The
trial Court then looks to Burkett v. Schwendiman, 773 P.2d 42 (Utah 1989),
to justify "dismissing a claim upon which no meaningful relief can be
granted." (R. at 1877).
The underlying problem, however, is that a determination that "no
meaningful relief can be granted" because of ostensible "circular
litigation," is contingent upon a prospective adjudication of facts and
circumstances that have not and may never occur, and where no presently
actionable controversy exists. The actual theory of "circular litigation" has
apparently never been accepted by Utah courts, as the neither the trial court

23

nor the Defendants can reference any Utah case law accepting this premise.
To grant summary judgment then, the trial court must simply make
assumptions about whether and how prospective, as yet non-existent, future
claims will arise and be resolved. This is reversible error.
B.

The trial court's grant of summary judgment is premised on
a bald assumption regarding the force and validity of a
contract between Mountain West and McKay-Dee.

There is nothing in the record or in the trial court's final order to
suggest that the court has ever even examined the indemnification
agreement allegedly concluded between Mountain West and McKay-Dee to
actually determine whether or not it would, in fact, be applicable to the
facts and circumstances present in this matter and create a "circuity of
litigation." It simply accepts, at face value, the self-serving representations
of the Defendants regarding their alleged arrangement.
The trial court apparently assumes that there are no viable contract
defenses that would or could render their agreement inapplicable or
unenforceable in this case. It makes no explicit findings evident in the
record about that agreement, but still purports to rule as a matter of law that
it is a legitimate link in an ostensible "indemnification chain" precluding
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Plaintiff from pursuing a claim against McKay-Dee Hospital. This too is
reversible error.
CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, this Court should overturn the trial
court's grant of summary judgment and remand this case for trial on the
merits.

f«

DATED this £$_ day of May, 2007.

PRINCE YEATES & GELDZAHLER

Fonathon T. Tichy
Bradley H. Parker
James W. McConkie II
Attorneys for Appellants
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ATTACHMENT A

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

VICKIE LYNN WARD, individually, as
Permanent Guardian of Terry Faye Ward,
and as Conservator of the Estate of Terry
Faye Ward,

RECEIVED
NOV 3 0 2006
Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler

Plaintiff,
vs.
STEVEN J. CARABINE, M.D.; IHC
HEALTH SERVICES, Inc., a Utah
corporation dba McKAY-DEE
HOSPITAL, and JOHN DOES 1-10.

RULING GRANTING MTN.
WEST ANESTHESIA'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Defendants.
Civil No. 010907610
Judge Ernie W. Jones
IHC HEALTH SERVICES, Inc., dba
McKAY-DEE HOSPITAL,
Third Party Plaintiff,
vs.
MOUNTAIN WEST ANESTHESIA, LLC,
Third Party Defendant.

On November 13, 2006, the Court heard oral argument on a motion for summary
judgment filed by Mountain West Anesthesia, LLC ("Mountain West") and joined in by
IHC Health Services ("McKay-Dee Hospital"). After the hearing, the Court took the
matter under advisement. Having now carefully considered the parties' memoranda and
oral argument, the Court grants the motion.

Ruling Granting Mountain West's Motion for Summaiy Judgment
No. 010907610

On July 18, 2000, Terry F. Ward was injured during an operation at McKay-Dee
Hospital. Prior to filing any complaint, Plaintiff settled its claims against Mountain West
and Dr. Luckwitz, the anesthesiologist for the operation. Mrs. Ward then filed the current
complaint, raising claims against McKay-Dee Hospital and Dr. Carabine, the surgeon
who performed the operation. Mrs. Ward's claims against both McKay-Dee Hospital and
Dr. Carabine have since been dismissed. The Court then allowed Mrs. Ward to amend
her complaint to include a claim against McKay-Dee Hospital under a theory of
ostensible agency. This claim is one for vicarious liability based on Dr. Luckwitz's
alleged negligence. This is the only cause of action remaining.
While the underlying basis for liability in Mrs. Ward's cause of action is
negligence, the controlling issues in this motion are issues of contract. Mrs. Ward settled
with Mountain West and, in exchange for $1,000,000, executed a general release on
March 16, 2001 ("release #1"). In this release, Mrs. Ward agreed to indemnify Mountain
West for any future claims based on the alleged negligence of Dr. Luckwitz. On March
29, 2001, Mrs. Ward executed another release ("release #2"). This release does not
include an indemnification clause. This case pivots on the current legal effect of these
two releases. The facts material to this determination are not in dispute,
I. Release #1 is an Enforceable Agreement.
Mrs. Ward claims that release #1 is not enforceable as it was signed by only Mrs.
Ward and her counsel. A contract must be in writing and signed only if and to the extent
required by the statute of frauds. A contract within the statute of frauds must be
evidenced by a writing and signed by the party to be charged. Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4.
In this case, Mrs. Ward agreed to both release her claims against Mountain West and to
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Ruling Granting Mountain West's Motion for Summary Judgment
No 010907610

indemnify them for any subsequent payments based on Dr. Luckwitz's alleged
negligence. Mrs. Ward, as the party to be charged under the indemnity agreement, signed
as required by Utah Code Ami. § 25-5-4(1 )(b). The statute of frauds is satisfied. See
Restatement (Second) Contracts § 135 (explaining that when a contract is within the
statute of frauds and is signed by fewer than all of the parties "the contract is enforceable
against the signers but not against the otheis).
Mrs. Ward signed release #1 in exchange for Mountain West's agreement "to pay
Ward the total sum of one million dollars ($1,000,000)." See Release #1 at § 1. Mrs.
Ward acknowledged receipt of payment. Id. at §§ 1,2. Although Mountain West did not
sign release #1, Mountain West had rendered performance. On March 16, 2001, the time
of release #1, the parties exchanged performances in a legally binding contract.
II. Release #2 Supplements Release #1.
Mrs. Ward argues that release #2 rescinded or superceded release #1. Specifically
Plaintiff cites "a time-honored maxim of contract law that a later agreement regarding a
given subject matter supersedes an earlier agreement pertaining to those issues."
Releases are contracts and the Court applies general contiact principles. Horgcm v. Indus.
Design Corp , 657 P.2d 751, 753 (Utah 1982).
Parties to any contract "may, by a new and later agreement, rescind it in whole or
in part, alter or modify it in any respect, add to or supplement it, or replace it by a
substitute." 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 500. The parties' intention regarding the effect
of the later agreement on the prior agreement is controlling. Id. Generally, however, the
original contract remains in force except as expressly superseded or contradicted by the
later agreement. Id.; Acequia, Inc. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 226 F.3d 798 (7th Cir,
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2000) (holding that when the examination of the language of the contracts along with
their attendant circumstances reveal that the parties did not intend the new contract to
supercede the prior contract, the prior contract remains in force insofar as it can be
harmonized with the later contract); Lincoln Elec. Co. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins.
Co., 210 F.3d 672 (6th Cir. 2000) (same).
In this case, the clear language of the two releases, along with the circumstances
surrounding their making, show that the parties did not intend release #2 to either rescind
or supercede release #1. Release #2 supplements release #1, providing for a structured
armuity not addressed in release #1. Nowhere in release #2 is indemnity either waived or
mentioned. The Court also notes the correspondence between Mr. Hardcastle, Mrs.
Ward's previous lawyer, and counsel for defendants making arrangements to sign release
#1. This correspondence discusses the need for "an additional release,5' one to which
Mountain West would not be a party, to provide for the annuity between Mrs. Ward and
the insurance company. Mrs. Ward's lawyer stated "[i]t is my understanding that we will
also need to sign a Release with the annuity company to finalize this matter . . . If you
have any questions or concerns regarding the language of either of these two releases,
please feel free to contact me." See Mr. Hardcastle's March 13, 2001 Letter (emphasis
added). Because release #2 neither supercedes release #1 nor contradicts release #Fs
indemnity provision, the Court harmonizes the two releases. The Court finds that
Mountain West and Mrs. Ward intended release #2 to supplement release #1, leaving
release #Fs indemnity provisions intact.
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III. The Reservation of Claims against McKay-Dee Hospital Does Not Affect
Mountain West's Contractual Right to Indemnification.
Mrs. Ward released all claims against Mountain West and Dr. Luckwitz. See
Release #1 at § 2. Mrs. Ward did not release her claims against the other defendants. Id.
The release states "[njolhing in this Release shall be construed as releasing Ward's
claims against Dr. Steven J. Carabine, McKay Dee Hospital, and/or its employees." Id.
Mrs. Ward seeks to recover damages from McKay Dee Hospital based on Dr. Luckwitz's
alleged negligence. Mountain West is contractually obligated to indemnify McKay Dee
Hospital for any damages its anesthesiologists cause—in this case, Dr. Luckwitz.
Pursuant to this contract, McKay Dee filed a third party complaint against Mountain
West for indemnification. Mountain West, in turn, claims that release #1 requires Mrs.
Ward to indemnify it for any money Mountain West pays out to McKay Dee based on
Dr. Luckwitz's alleged negligence.
Mrs. Ward argues that the indemnification clause in release #1 should not apply in
this case because the parties "intended that nothing in the settlement should in any way
compromise or hinder Plaintiffs claim against McKay-Dee Hospital" See P.'s Opp.
Memo at \ 5. The Court disagrees. The releases state that nothing in them "shall be
construed as releasing" Mrs. Ward's claims against McKay Dee Hospital or Dr.
Carabine. This is not a question of whether Mrs. Ward released her claims against
McKay Dee Hospital or Dr. Carabine. Both releases expressly limited their own scope to
exclude those claims. The Court has already ruled on this matter. However, limiting the
scope of the release does not guarantee an unimpeded right to recover from McKay Dee
Hospital or require either McKay Dee Hospital or Mountain West to lay down their
contractual rights to indemnification.
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When interpreting a contract, the Court tcmust first attempt to harmonize all of the
contract's provisions and all of its terms when determining whether the plain language of
the contract is ambiguous." Gilmor v. Macey, 121 P.3d 57, 65 (Utah Ct. App. 2005)
(quoting Wagner v. Clifton, 62 P.3d 440 (Utah 2002)). It is well-established "that a
contract should be interpreted so as to harmonize all of its provisions and all of its terms,
which terms should be given effect if it is possible to do so." LDS Hosp. v. Capitol Life
Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1988). In this case, the argument that the reservation
of claims provision conflicts with and trumps the application of the indemnification
provision fails, as both are easily harmonized. At the time the parties signed the releases,
Mrs. Ward had potential claims against Dr. Carabine for his negligence and against
McKay Dee for its own negligence. The releases did not release either claim. Mrs. Ward
in fact brought these claims. Neither claim was based on vicarious liability for Dr.
Luckwitz and neither, if successful, would have triggered the indemnification clause.
Only after both claims were dismissed, did Mrs. Ward amend her complaint to claim that
McKay Dee Hospital is vicariously liable for Dr. Luckwitz's alleged negligence. The
fact that Mrs. Ward did not release McKay Dee Hospital in her settlement with Mountain
West does not protect her from the application of Mountain West's contractual right to
indemnification.
"If the language within the four corners of the contract is unambiguous, the
parties' intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the contractual language,
and the contract may be interpreted as a matter of law." Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn,
84 P.3d 1134, 1140 (Utah 2003). The Court has previously found the language of the
releases unambiguous. Under the unambiguous language of release #1, the Court finds
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that the paities intended that Mountain West would not be required to pay any subsequent
amounts based on the incident of Dr. Luckwitz's alleged negligence. The Court finds no
justification to eviscerate the hold harmless provision intended to give this intention
effect.
III. The Chain of Indemnity Agreements Creates Circular Litigation.
Dismissing a claim upon which no meaningful relief can be granted is
appropriate. See Bvrkell v. Schwendiman, 113 P.2d 42 (Utah 1989) (dismissing an appeal
of a one year license suspension because the suspension had expired); Maryland Cas Co.
v. Employers Mut Liab. Ins. Co., 208 F.2d 731 (2d. Cir. 1953) (dismissing claim against
employer for the employee's negligence where settlement with employee created a
"complete circuity of action"). The Court has already found that the indemnity
agreement in release #1 is enforceable under its plain terms. Accordingly, in the event
Mrs. Ward is awarded damages against McKay Dee Hospital, McKay Dee Hospital has a
contractual right to indemnification from Mountain West, which has a contractual right to
indemnification from Mrs. Ward. Mrs. Ward cannot obtain any further meaningful
judicial relief. The Court, therefore, dismisses Mrs. Ward's claim against McKay Dee
Hospital. Counsel for Mountain West will please prepare the appropriate order.
Dated this ~Z~( day of November, 2006.

\^r^Erme W. Jones, Judge
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Certificate of Mailing
I hereby certify that on

of November, 2006,1 mailed a copy of the

foregoing memorandum decision to counsel, as follows:

Bradley H. Parker
James W. McConkie
Counsel for Plaintiffs
175 East 400 South, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

George A. Hunt
Counsel for Mountain West Anesthesia
P.O. Box 45678
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145

JoAnn E. Carnahan
Julia M. Houser
Counsel for IHC Health Services, Inc.
P.O. Box 4050
Salt Lake Citv Utah 84111

y^iJ^A^^JM/

LqM Deputy Court dlerk

ATTACHMENT B

RELEASE AND SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

This Release and Settlement Agreement ("Agreement") is made and entered into
among Vickie L. Ward, individually and as permanent Guardian of Terry Faye Ward, an
incapacitated adult and Conservator of the Estate of Terry Faye Ward, an incapacitated
adult; Mountain West Anesthesia, LLC, John Luckwitz, M.D.; and Scottsdale Insurance
Company ("the Parties"). \The "Claimant" shall collectively mean Vickie L Ward,
individually and as permanent Guardian of Terry Faye Ward, an incapacitated adult and
Conservator of the Estate of Terry Faye Ward, an incapacitated adult, their respective
heirs, executors, administrators, personal representatives, successors and assigns; the
"Insured" shall collectively mean Mountain West Anesthesia, LLC, and John Luckwitz,
M.D.; and the "Insurance Company" shall mean Scottsdale Insurance Company.

L RECITALS

A. On or about July 18, 2000, at or near 3939 Harrison Boulevard, Ogden/Weber
County, Utah, the Claimant claims that Terry Faye Ward .sustained physical injuries as a
result of the alleged conduct of the Insured (the "Incident").

In connection -with "the

Incident, the Claimant has asserted a claim against the insured based upon tort or tort
type claims.

B. The Insurance Company and the Insured have entered into a liability insurance
contract which provides that the Insurance Company shall defend the Insured against any
claim or suit for damages arising from the Incident, has authority to settle any such claim

?

or suit on behalf of and as agent for the Insured, and shall insure the Insured for such

i
f.

liability subject to the limits set forth in the contract.

w
M

i
IS

C. The Parties desire to enter into this Agreement to provide, among other things,

^

for considerations in full settlement and discharge of all claims and actions of the Claimant
against the Insured for damages which allegedly arose out of or due to the Incident on the
terms and conditions set forth in this Agreement

NOW, THEREFORE, it is agreed as follows:

II. RELEASE

A. Release and Discharge, In consideration of the cash payment(s) referred to in
Paragraph III A and the promise to make the periodic payments referred to in Paragraph
IILB. C'P^odic Payments"), the Claimant hereby completely releases and forever
discharges the Insured, the Insurance Company, and any and all other persons, limns, or
corporations from any and all past present or future claims, demands,-actions^damages,
costs, expenses, loss of services, and causes of action of any kind or diaracter.^vhether
based on tort, contract, or other theory of recovery, whether known or unknown, including
any and all claims for loss of marital services and consortium, which have arisen in the
past or which may arise in the future, whether directly or indirectly, caused by, connected
with or resulting from the Incident This release and discharge shall be a fully binding and
complete settlement among all Parties to this Agreement and their heirs, assigns, and
2
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successors. Nothing in this Release and the attached Uniform Qualified Assignment and

la

$

Release shall be construed as releasing Claimant's claims against Dr. Steven J, Carabine

»*
n

si

and/or McKay Dee Hospital and it's employees.

The Claimant acknowledges and agrees that this release and discharge is a
general release. The Claimant expressly waives and assumes the risk of any and all
claims for damages and expenses against the Insured, which exist as of this date, but of
which the Claimant does nbt know or suspect to exist, whether through ignorance,
oversight, error, negligence, or otherwise, and which, if known, would materially affect the
Claimants decision to enter into this Agreement The Claimant further agrees that the
Claimant has accepted the considerations set forth in Paragraphs III A, and B. as a
complete compromise of matters involving disputed issues of law and fact The Claimant
assumes the risk that the facts or law may be other than the Claimant believes. It is
understood and agreed to by the Parties that this settlement is a compromise of a doubtful
and disputed claim, and the payments are not to be construed as an admission of liability
on the part of the Insured, by whom liability is expressly denied.

B.

Injuries Known and Unknown, The Claimant fully understands7 that the

Claimant may have suffered personal injuries that are unknown to the Claimant at present
and that unknown complications of present known injuries may arise, develop or be
discovered in the future, including, but not limited to, subsequent death or disability. The
Claimant acknowledges that the consideration received under this Agreement is intended
to and does release and discharge the Insured and the Insurance Company from any
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claims for, or consequences arising from, the injuries which allegedly arose from the

$

Incident; and the Claimant hereby waives any rights to assert in the future any claims not

n
*

now known or suspected even though, if such claims were known, such knowledge would

^

materially affect the terms of this Agreement.

I
2

i
C. Parties Released. This release and discharge shall also apply to the Insured's
and the Insurance Company's past, present, and future officers, directors, stockholders,
attorneys, agents, servants, representatives, employees, subsidiaries, affiliates, reinsurers,
partners, predecessors and successors

in interest, heirs, executors, personal

representatives, and assigns and all other persons, firms or corporations with whom any of
t i e former have been, are now, or may hereafter be affiliated.
HI. PAYMENTS TO CLAIMANT. PAYEE, AND/OR BENEFICIARY

A.

Payment at Settlement (and Amounts Previously Paid). The Insurance

Company and the Insured have paid Three Hundred Ninety Three Thousand Three
Hundred Thirty Three Dollars ($393,333) to the Claimant, and Claimant's counsel, jUqyd
Hardcastle, receipt of which is acknowledged. This includes, but is not limited tdf all put; of
pocket expenses, attorney fees, all medical liens, all rights of recovery, all medical
subrogation claims, all worker compensation subrogation claims, known and unknown,
and claims for general damages.
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B. Periodic Payments. The Insurance Company, on behalf of the Insured, agrees
to pay or cause to be paid the following Periodic Payments:

(1) To Vickie L Ward, Trustee of the Terry F. Wand Trust ("Payee"), the sum of Two
Thousand Seven Hundred Two Dollars ($2,702) to be paid on or about the
twenty ninth (29th) day of each month beginning on or about April 29, 2001, and
continuing for the life of Terry Faye Ward,

The aforesaid payments are

guaranteed to be pvaid for a period of two hundred sixty five (265) months, with
the last guaranteed payment to be made on or about April 29,2023.

(2)

Should Terry Faye Wand die before April 29, 2023, then any remaining
guaranteed Periodic Payments set forth in Subparagraph ULB.(1) shall instead
be paid, subject to the provisions of Subparagraph lll.B.(5) below, as they
become due, to Vickie L Ward ("Beneficiary*), with the last guaranteed
Periodic Payment to be made on or about April 29, 2023. Should Vickie L
Ward die before the remaining guaranteed Periodic Payments are made as set
forth in Subparagraph lll.B.(1)f then all remaining guaranteed Periodic
Payments "will be made subject to the provisions of Subparagraph :1ILBX5)
below, as they come due, to the duly appointed Successor Taistee of the Terry
Faye Ward Trust with the last payment to be on or about April 29, 2023.
Should Terry Faye Ward die after April 29, 2023, then monthly payments as
set forth in Subparagraph I1LB.(1) shall cease.
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(3) To the Trustee of the Vickie L Ward Trust ("Payee"), the sum of One Thousand
Five Hundred Eighty Seven Dollars ($1,587) to be paid on or about the first
(1^) day of each month, beginning on or about May 1, 2001, guaranteed to be
paid for a period of one hundred eighty (180) months, with the last guaranteed
payment to be made on or about April 1,2016,
(4)

Should Vickie L Ward die before April 1,2016, then any remaining guaranteed
Periodic Payments sent forth in Subparagraph HLB-(3), shall instead be paid,
subject to the provisions of Subparagraph UIB,(5) below, as they become due,
to the duly appointed Successor Trustee of the Vicky L Ward Trust, with the
last payment to be made on or about April 1,2016.

(5) Each Payee shall have the right to submit a request to diange the Benefidary by
filing a written request with the owner of the Annuity Contract The^change witt
be effective when approved by both the owner of the Annuity Contract and the
Annuity Issuer. Any change in the Beneficiary shall not ki any way affect or after
any of the provisions of this Agreement

IV. ASSIGNMENT AND FUNDING OF PERIODIC PAYMENT OBUGATIQN

A

Assignment of Obligation

The Parties understand ..and agree that.the

Insurance Company may assign Its duties and obligations to make such future Periodic
Payments to GECapMAs^gnmentCorporatkm CAssignee") pursuant to a "Qualified
Assignment and Release," within the meaning of Section 130(c) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986, as amended, attached as Exhibit A. Such assignment is accepted by the
6
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Claimant without right of rejection and in full discharge and release of the duties and

g

obligations of the Insurance Company and all Parties released by this Agreement with

M

0

#

respect to such Periodic Payments. Upon such assignment it is understood and agreed

s

by and between the Parties that the Assignee shall make said Periodic Payments directly

s
3

to the respective Payee and/or Beneficiary designated in Subparagraphs III.B.(1) and (2),
and that the Payee shall submit any request to change the Beneficiary directly to the
Assignee.
THE PARTIES EXPRESSLY UNDERSTAND AND AGREE THAT, WITH THE
INSURANCE COMPANYS ASSIGNMENT OF THE DUTIES AND OBLIGATIONS TO
MAKE SUCH PERIODIC PAYMENTS TO GE CAPITAL ASSIGNMENT CORPORATION
PURSUANT TO THIS AGREEMENT, ALL OF THE DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
OTHERWISE IMPOSED UPON THE INSURANCE COMPANY BY THIS AGREEMENT
WITH RESPECT TO SUCH PERIODIC PAYMENTS SHALL CEASE, AND INSTEAD
SUCH OBLIGATION SHALL BE BINDING SOLELY UPON GE CAPITAL ASSIGNMENT
CORPORATION. THE PARTIES FURTHER UNDERSTAND AND AGREE THAT WHEN
THE ASSIGNMENT IS MADE THE INSURANCE COMPANY SHALL BE RELEASED
FROM ALL

OBLIGATIONS TO

MAKE

SUCH

GE CAPITAL ASSIGNMENT CORPORATION

PERIODIC

PAYMENTS

AND

SHALL AT ALL TIMES BE DIRECTLY

AND SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR, AND SHALL RECEIVE CREDIT FOR, THE
PERIODIC PAYMENTS, AND THAT WHEN THE ASSIGNMENT IS MADE, GE CAPITAL
ASSIGNMENT CORPORATION ASSUMES THE DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF
THE INSURANCE COMPANY WITH RESPECT T O SUCH PERIODIC PAYMENTS.
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B. Annuity Funding. The Parties understand and agree that the Assignee may

k0

ej

fund its obligation to make the Periodic Payments by purchasing an annuity contract (the

J*

Annuity Contract") from GE Capital Assurance Company (the "Annuity Issuer").

\

Annuity Contract is purchased, the Assignee shall be the owner of the Annuity Contract

S

and shall have and retain all rights of ownership in the Annuity Contract

If such

For its own convenience, the Assignee may direct the Annuity Issuer to make all the
Periodic Payments directly td the respective Payees and/or Beneficiaries designated in
Paragraph lll.B.

Each Payee and Beneficiary designated in Paragraph I1U3. shall be

responsible for maintaining his/her current mailing address with the Annuity Issuer.
The obligation assumed by the Assignee to make each Periodic Payment shall be
fully discharged upon the mailing of a valid check or electronic funds transfer in the
amount of such payment on or before the due date to the last address on record for the
Payee or Beneficiary with the Annuity Issuer.

If the Payee or Beneficiary notifies the

Assignee that any check or electronic funds transfer was not received, the Assignee shall
direct the Annuity Issuer to initiate a stop payment action and, upon confirmation that such
check was not previously negotiated or electronic funds transfer deposited, shall have the
Annuity Issuer process a replacement payment
C.

Status of Claimant Payees, and Beneficiaries, The Claimant, each Payee

and each Beneficiary, as applicable, shall at all times remain a general creditor of the
Assignee and shall have no rights in the Annuity Contract nor in any other assets of the
Assignee. The Assignee shall not be required to set aside sufficient assets or secure its
obligation to the Claimant, each Payee, or each Beneficiary, in any manner whatsoever.

8
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D.

Date of Birth.

The Claimant, Vickie L Ward, warrants and represents that

Terry Faye Ward was born on April 29,1958, Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in

I
s
£

Company or the Assignee relies or has relied on the accuracy of the above-stated date of

«

birth in determining the amount, timing and/or duration of the Periodic Payments or the

this Agreement, if the actual date of birth is not as stated above, and if the Insurance

cost of providing them, the Insurance Company or the Assignee may take such actions as
are necessary to reflect the correct date of birth. These actions include but are not limited
to: 1) adjusting the amount timing and/or duration of the remaining Periodic Payments so
that the Insurance Company or Assignee incurs no additional cost beyond that necessary
to purchase the Annuity Contract on the date of assignment to provide the Periodic
Payments based on the correct date of birth or 2) recovering from the Claimant, Payee, or
Beneficiary, as appropriate, any Periodic Payments already paid in excess of the Periodic
Payments that could have been provided by an Annuity Contract purchased on the date of
assignment based on the correct date of birth.
V. NO CHANGES IN PERIODIC PAYMENTS

The Claimant acknowledges and agrees that all, some, or any part of the Periodic
Payments cannot be accelerated, commuted, transferred, deferred, increased or
decreased by the Claimant or by any Payee or Beneficiary and that the Claimant or any
Payee or Beneficiary shall not have the power to sell, mortgage, encumber, or otherwise
anticipate all, some, or any part of the Periodic Payments by assignment or otherwise.

9

VL ENTIRE AGREEMENT

This Agreement contains the entire agreement between the Claimant the Insured,

a

and the Insurance Company with regard to the matters set forth in it. There are no other
understandings or agreements, verbal or otherwise, in relation to the Agreement between
the Parties except as expressly set forth in it.

This Agreement is intended to conform with the requirements of Internal Revenue
Code Sections 104(a)(2) and 130. All provisions of this Agreement should be construed in
a manner so as to effectuate that intent

VIL READING OF AGREEMENT

In entering into this Agreement, the Claimant represents that the Claimant has
completely read all of its terms and that such terms are fully understood and voluntarily
accepted bv the Claimant

The Claimant has been represented by counsel of the

Claimants choice.

VtIL FUTURE COOPERATION

All Parties agree to cooperate fully, to execute any and all supplementary
documents, and to take all additional actions that may be necessary or appropriate to give

10
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full force and effect to the terms and intent of this Agreement which are not inconsistent

t*

«

with its terms.

M

3

s

,x

« DRAFTING OF DOCUMENT AND RELIANCE BY CLAIMANT

This Agreement has been negotiated by the respective Parties through counsel The
Parties to this Agreement contemplate and intend that all payments set forth in Section 111
constitute damages received on account of personal injuries or sickness, arising from the
Incident, within the meaning of Section 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
amended. However, the Claimant warrants, represents, and agrees that the Claimant is
not relying on the advice of the Insured, the Insurance Company, anyone associated with
them, induding their attorneys and the insurance broker placing the Annuity Contract, as
to the legal and income tax or other consequences of any kind arising out of this
Agreement Accordingly, the Claimant hereby releases and holds harmless the Insured,
the Insurance Company, and any and all counsel or consultants for the Insured and the
Insurance Company from any claim, cause of action, or other rights of any kind which the
Claimant may assert because the legal, income tax or other consequences of this
Agreement are other than those anticipated by the Claimant

The Parties signing this Agreement, and each of them, warrant and represent that no
promise, inducement or agreement not expressed in this Agreement has been made to
them and that this Agreement constitutes the entire agreement between the Parties and
that the terms of this Agreement are contractual and not mere recitals

11
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The Claimant represents and agrees that the Claimant has read the Agreement and

%

fully understands it, and has been advised by counsel of the Claimant's own choosing as

|

to the propriety and legal effect of executing it, and neither the Agreement nor the

*

compromise and settlement recited in it were induced by fraud, coercion, compulsion or

S
w

mistake, nor is this Agreement nor the compromise and settlement made in reliance upon
any statement or representation of any of the Parties released by this Agreement or their
representatives, agents or attorneys.
X. WARRANTY OF CAPACITY TO EXECUTE AGREEMENT

The Claimant represents and warrants that, with the exception of contingency fee
contracts and any agreements which may exist between the Claimant and Claimant's
counsel relative to the reimbursement of litigation expenses, no other person or entity has,
or has had, any interest in the claims, demands, obligations, or causes of action referred to
in this Agreement, and that the Claimant has the sole right and exclusive authority to
execute this Agreement and receive the sums specified in it and that the Claimant has not
sold, assigned, transferred, conveyed or otherwise disposed of any of the claims,
demands, obligations or causes of action referred to in this Agreement.

XI. COURT APPROVAL

The Parties agree that the Claimant will file petitions for all necessary court
approvals, that all such petitions and orders shall be in a form satisfactory to all Parties,
and that this Agreement will not be effective until such approvals have been obtained.

12
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XII- CONTROLLING LAW

This Agreement shall be construed and interpreted in accordance with the laws of
the State of Utah.

s
Dated:

3-33-01

/,LrbubH!.(jJOUi£L
Vickie L Wand, individually and as permanent Guardian
of Terry Faye Ward, an incapacitated adult and as
Conservator of the Estate of Terry Faye Ward, an
incapacitated adult, Claimant

Dated

• A3\QI

V^U^tACS^ Cib+J^tS
Duly Authorized Representative for Scottsdale
Insurance Company

Approved as to Form and Content
Dated:
loyd Hal

, Counsel for Claimant
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V1CKIB LYNN WARD, individually and as permanent guardian of TERRY FAY1Z
WARD, an incapacitated adult, and as conservator of the ESTATlf OF TERRY 1< AYE WARD,
an incapacitated adult (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Ward") and MOUNTAIN WEST
ANHSTUESIA, LLC, all of its associated physicians including JOHN LUCKWITZ, MJX, and
SCCHTSD ALE INSURANCE COMPANY (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Insured"),
ami their respective heirs, executors, administrators, personal representatives, successors, agents,
employees, indemnitors and assigns, enter into this Settlement Agreement and General Release
(hcreinafler referred to as "Settlement Agreement"), for the consideration hereinafter set forth
ilus JA^Y
of March, 2001.

1.

Settlement Payments.

Concurrently with the execution of this Settlement Agreement, Insured agrees to pay
Ward the lotnl sum of one million dollars ($1,000,000), receipt of which is hereby
acknowledged,

2.

Release of All Claims.

In consideration of the payment referred to above, the receipt and sufficiency of which is
hereby acknowledged, Ward, for and on behalf of her heirs, administrators, successors and
assigns, hereby releases, acquits and forever discharges Insured and their past, present and future
officers, directors, stockholders, attorneys, agents, physicians, servants, representatives,
employees, subsidiaries, affiliates, partners, insureds, predecessors and successors in interest, and
all other persons or entities, for whose conduct they may be liable, of and from any and all
claims, demands, damages, causes of action, suits and liabilities, which Ward now has or which
way hereafter accrue, because of, arising out of or in any way connected with any act or omission
committed prior to the date of this Settlement Agreement, including specifically, but without
limitation, lo medical caro and treatment (or the alleged lack thereof) rendcrcd prior io the date of
this Settlement Agreement, which medical care and treatment is alleged to have caused injury,
damage, and loss to Ward on or about July 18,2000, at or near 3939 Harrison Boulevard, Ogdcn.
Vcbci County, Utah, arising out of surgery and care at McKay Dec Hospital. Nothing in this
Release shall be construed as releasing Ward's claims against Dr. Steven J. Carabine, McKay
f)ee Hospital, and/or its employees.
Ward understands and agrees that the sum paid, as specified in this Settlement
Agreement, constitutes full and complete satisfaction of all claims she now has or which may
hereafter accrue against Insured, and ail other persons or entities for whose conduct Insured may
bo liable by reason of acts and omissions committed prior to the date of tins Settlement
Agreement and that this is a document of release of ail claims including, but not limited to,
claims fun pain and .suffering; personal injury, death, permanent disability; bodily impairment;
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neurological injury and damage; loss of cognitive abilities, loss of bodily function and function
of organs, glands, structures, tissues and muscles; loss of consortium; psychological or emotional
damage, distress or anxiety; loss or impairment of earning capacity* loss of wages and salary and
all oilier employment and income losses of every kind and character; hospital, surgical, medical,
nursing and drug expenses and ail other expenses arising from bodily injury or impairment;
punitive damages; attorney fees and legal costs; and claims of every other kind and character
against Insured and all oilier persons or entities for whose conduct they may be liable arising
from "or relating to acts and omissions committed prior to the date of tills Settlement Agreement

3, General .Release.
Ward hereby acknowledges and agrees that the release of claims against Insured is a
general rolcusc, iind she further expressly waives and assumes the risk of any and all claims for
damages against Insured which exist as of this date, but which Ward does not know of or suspect
to exist, whether through ignorance, oversight, error, negligence, or otherwise, and which, if
known, would materially affect her decision to enter into this Settlement Agreement, Ward
further agrees to accept payment of the sum specified in this Settlement Agreement as a complete
compromise of matters involving disputed issues of law and fact and she fully assumes the risk
that the facts or law may be otherwise than she believes.

4«

Warranty of Capacity to Execute Agreement

Ward represents nnd warrants that no other person or entity has or has had any interest in
the claims, demands, obligations or causes of action referred to in this Settlement Agreement;
that she has the sole right and exclusive authority to execute this Settlement Agreement and
receive the sum specified in it; and that she has not sold, assigned, transferred, conveyed or
otherwise disposed of any of the claims, demands, obligations or causes of action referred to in
tins Settlement Agreement Ward warrants that she has received no notice of any subrogation
claims against the amounts to be paid pursuant to this Settlement Agreement and further warrants
that she has received no Medicaid assistance for which reimbursement may be owed pursuant to
live Medical Hcuufits Recovery Act, U.C.A, § 26-19-1, et seq.

5.

Disclaimer of Liability,

Ward acknowledges and agrees that she accepts payment of the sum specified in this
Settlement Agreement as a full and complete compromise of matters involving disputed issues;
Hut neither payment of the sum specified herein nor the negotiation for this settlement shall be

§
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eonsliucd as admissions of the Insured; that no past or present wrongdoing on the part of Insured
shall bo implied by such payment or negotiation,

6,

KlUiro At>rc?cmentand Successors in Interest.

Ward acknowledges and agrees that this Setdcnicnt Agreement contains the entire
agreement between herself and Insured with regard (o the matters set forth in this Settlement
Agreement and that this Settlement Agreement shall be binding upon a n d inure to the benefit of
the executors, administrator?, personal representatives, heirs, indemnitors, successors, officers,
directors} employees and assigns of each,

?•

Indemnification.

As consideration for (ho payment described in paragraph 1 of the Settlement Agreement,
Ward agrees to indemnify Insured from all claims o f Ward or others arising from or in any way
connected with the actual or alleged acts or omissions of Insured occurring prior to the date
hereof Ward also agrees <o satisfy all legal rights for contribution, subrogation and indemnity
and to hold the Insured harmless from all such claims., including but not limited to such claims o f
public or private health insurance companies or state or federal agencies.
8«

Confidentiality.

Insured and Wan! agree that neither they nor their attorneys or representatives shall reveal
to anyone, other than to Ward's financial advisors, or as may be mutually agreed to in writing or
by order of a court of competent jurisdiction, any of the terms of this Settlement Agreement, or
any of the amounts, numbers, terms, or conditions of any sums payable to Ward as sot forth,
9,

f\cprCsScnin(ion of Comprehension of Document.

In entering into Urn Settlement Agreement, Ward represents that she has relied upon the
legal advice of her attorney, who is the attorney of her choice, that the terms of this Settlement
Agrccmcnt liavc been completely read and explained to her by her attorney and that she fully
understands and voluntarily accepts them,
10«

Court Approval

Wardthat
warrants
she hasbyfded
Agreement,
may bethat
required
law.or will file for all necessary court approvals of tin's
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